I am a PhD candidate at the Hertie School and a Research Associate at the Hertie School Centre for Sustainability.
From January to April 2025 I was a Visiting Research Student at the Grantham Research Centre on Climate Change and the Environment at
the London School of Economics and Political Science. I hold a First Class BA
in History and English from the University of Oxford and a Master of Public Policy with Distinction from the Hertie School.
My research examines the politics of climate change in high-income democracies. I focus on political barriers to (and enablers of) ambitious climate policy action, including the role of party politics, institutions, compensation, and public opinion.
I employ both quantitative and qualitative empirical methods.
- (How) do climate institutions matter? Presenting and applying a new framework for the comparative analysis of climate institutions
With Jacob Edenhofer and Christian Flachsland
OSF Link
Abstract
Climate institutions, including climate laws and advisory bodies, have proliferated globally. But do they matter? Existing work either analyses quantitatively how these institutions correlate with policy outcomes, like stringency or emissions reductions, or qualitatively examines a single type of institution. Neither strand provides tools to systematically analyse the effects of these institutions on the policymaking process itself. We therefore propose the Climate Institutions Analysis Framework (CIAF), which traces how institutions' formal functions interact with country-specific contextual variables to address 'strategic challenges'. Comparing climate institutions in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia, we show that they support agenda-setting, increase transparency, signal commitment, and hold governments accountable. Notably, similarly designed institutions can produce divergent effects across countries due to variation in context. By conceptualising a new class of effects and their mechanisms, our framework contributes to debates about policy sequencing amid climate backlash and to comparative analysis of meso-level institutions.
-
When do green parties matter? Green party bargaining leverage and climate policy stringency
With Christian Flachsland and Mark Kayser
Draft available upon request
Abstract
Political parties are often overlooked in studies of net zero transitions. Despite our growing understanding of the influence of public opinion, interest groups, and institutions, we know little about the role of parties in
determining climate policy. This paper addresses a specific puzzle: when do Green Parties (GPs) deliver stringent climate reforms? Theoretically, the success of 'green' special interest parties should lead to better climate policy
outcomes. Yet evidence of the effect of GP representation in parliament and government is mixed. We argue coalition bargaining leverage — the capacity for a GP to demand its preferred outcome in negotiations based on an expanded set
of coalition options — is a missing link in the relationship between GPs and policy change. Building on a novel, empirical measure of leverage developed by Kayser et al. (2023), we test whether multiparty
systems are more likely to implement (more) stringent climate policies when GPs increase their leverage. We measure changes in climate policy stringency using a new harmonised cross-country database from the OECD. Our results show GP leverage is associated with greater climate policy stringency and has a stronger effect than a GP being in government or increasing its support in the polls. We only identify this pattern, however, in the electricity sector. GP leverage appears to have had little effect (so far) on policies in the industrial, buildings, and transport sectors. Our findings motivate theoretical and empirical study of the political economies of different sectors of climate policy.
- The political consequences of climate ambition: evidence from Australia
OSF Preprint
Abstract
Why do we observe a backlash against the green transition before it has substantially begun? I examine the political consequences of climate ambition by analysing how voters respond prospectively to proposed climate policies. I argue that 'potential losers' — those vulnerable to decarbonisation but not directly threatened by proposed policies — present a strategic dilemma for pro-climate parties: compensating them may be infeasible or inadvertently signal their vulnerability, yet ignoring them allows rivals to mobilise their opposition. I test this in Australia's 2019 federal election, when one major party campaigned on an ambitious climate agenda. Leveraging heterogeneity in Australia's coal industry, I estimate voters' responses in communities reliant on domestic ('actual losers') and export coal ('potential losers') in a difference-in-differences design. Uncompensated potential losers resoundingly rejected the pro-climate party, while compensated actual losers did not, revealing how heterogeneous exposure and party strategies interact to shape the political feasibility of climate action.
-
Economic booms and the electoral success of green parties: cross border evidence from Switzerland's neighbours
With Tom Arend and Mark Kayser
Draft available upon request
Abstract
Scholars have long known that the the economy influences the electoral success of incumbent parties. We argue here that the business cycle also influences the support for a specific type of party -- Green parties -- independent of incumbent status. When Switzerland liberalized its labor market in 2002, permitting EU citizens to work in the country, they induced an exogenous income shock in the bordering regions of the neighboring countries. We leverage this natural experiment to test for causal income effects on green party vote share with difference-in-differences models in municipalities near the Swiss border. Individual-level DiD estimates in France confirm a mechanism, showing increased income and support for environmental movements in border areas. Support for green parties has long been stronger among the affluent. We demonstrate a different phenomenon: that short-run income shocks increase support for the Greens, the party family that is most strongly associated with non-material policies.
-
How, or how much? Preferences for institutional design for compensation. (Pre Analysis Plan)
With Jacob Edenhofer
Draft available upon request
Abstract
Ambitious climate policy often imposes concentrated, short‐term costs on particular constituencies—workers and firms in carbon‐intensive sectors, households facing higher energy bills, and communities dependent on fossil‐fuel industries. To mitigate political backlash, governments offer climate compensation (or "just transition") packages. Yet empirical studies reveal mixed evidence on compensation's ability to build or sustain public support. We argue that this inconsistency stems from three distinct sources of uncertainty: (1) time‐inconsistency (will future governments honour promises?), (2) delivery risk (will funds actually reach intended beneficiaries?), and (3) representation gaps (do individuals trust that their interests are represented in allocation decisions?). Our theoretical framework lays out, in narrative form, how each uncertainty channel affects the compensation threshold a voter requires, and how different institutional features—legislative lock‐ins, central versus regional delivery, local advisory panels—trade off these uncertainties. We then outline a rating‐based conjoint experiment that randomises within each profile: commitment mechanism, delivery agent, representation mode, and compensation amount. Finally, we specify our preregistered analyses, including tests of how perceived representation gaps moderate preferences over commitment features.
